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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon U.C.A. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) (2010). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly found that, under Utah law, a private 
easement is automatically created on a private road in favor of landowners abutting 
the private road by virtue of a recorded plat. 
Standard of review: Correctness. 'The question of whether or not an easement 
exists is a conclusion of law." Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, %7, 977 P.2d 533. 
Preservation for Appeal: Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 1. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There is no constitutional or statutory provision relevant to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a dispute over a private lane ("Oak Lane") in Alpine. Utah. 
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the Court of Appeal's decision creating a private easement 
in favor of Respondents on Oak Lane by virtue of the subdivision plat. 
Procedural History 
Petitioner Oak Lane Homeowners Association ("the Association") filed this case 
in District Court on November 19, 2003. (R. 2-10.) On April 7, 2004, Respondents 
Dennis Griffm and Renae Griffin ("the Griffins") filed a motion for summary judgment. 
(R. 210-288.) On August 20, 2004, the Trial Court granted the Griffins' motion, based 
on its own research. (R. 374-78.) On December 8, 2004, the Trial Court issued a second 
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ruling granting the Griffins' motion, this time on a different basis than that of the August 
20, 2004 ruling. (R. 441-46.) The Association appealed the Trial Court's rulings. 
(R.457-58.) On November 24, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court, 
finding that an issue of fact precluded summary judgment, and remanded for further 
proceedings. Oak Lane Homeowners Assoc, v. Griffin. 2006 UT App 465. 153 P.3d 740. 
(R. 473-76.) 
On remand to the Trial Court, the Griffins filed a second motion for summary 
judgment on July 16. 2007. (R. 660-673.) After briefing and oral arguments, the trial 
court granted the Griffins' motion and entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and a 
judgment on December 21, 2007, finding that the Griffins, as abutting landowners, were 
entitled to a private easement on Oak Lane by virtue of the subdivision plat.1 (R. 600-04.) 
The Association again appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the Trial Court's ruling and adopted a new kind of private easement previously 
unrecognized under Utah law - an automatic private easement in favor of abutting 
landowners on a private road by virtue of a plat. See, Oak Lane Homeowners Assoc, v. 
Griffin. 2009 UT App 248, 219 P.3d 64 ("Oak Lane IF).2 The Association now appeals 
the Court of Appeals' decision to this Court 
Statement of Facts 
Oak Lane is a private lane in the Oak Hills Subdivision, v^hich contains five lots. 
Oak Lane IL 2009 UT App 248 at % 2. (R. 532.) On January 13. 1977. the seven original 
1
 A true and correct copy of the Trial Court's findings is included as Addendum A. 
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owners of the five lots in the subdivision signed the plat.J Id. at ^  3. (R. 532.) In the 
"Owner's Dedication" on the plat, the owners expressly refused to dedicate the "Private 
Lane" to the public by striking the dedicatory language: 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT WE, ALL OF THE 
UNDERSIGNED OWNERS OF ALL OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN 
THE SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATE HEREON AND SHOWN ON THIS 
MAP, HAVE CAUSED THE SAME TO BE SUBDIVIDED INTO LOTS, 
BLOCKS, STREETS AND EASEMENTS AND DO HEREBY DEDICATE 
THE STREETS AND OTHER PUBLIC AREAS AS INDICATED HEREON 
FOR PERPETUAL USE OF THE PUBLIC. 
Id. The Alpine City Council accepted the plat on the same day, likewise striking the 
dedicatory acceptance language: 
THE CITY COUNCIL OF ALPINE CITY, COUNTY OF UTAH, 
APPROVES THIS SUBDIVISION AND HEREBY ACCEPTS THE 
DEDICATION OF ALL STREETS, EASEMENTS, AND OTHER PARCELS 
OF LAND INTENDED FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES FOR THE PERPETUAL 
USE OF THE PUBLIC THIS 13th DAY OF JANUARY, A.D. 1977. 
Id. The plat was recorded in 1977. Id. 
The Griffins purchased lot 2 of the Oak Hills Subdivision in 1988. Id. at ^  5. (R. 
132, 139.) Lot 2 is accessed through a public road, High Bench Road. (R. 141.) In fact, 
the garage on Lot 2 can only be accessed via High Bench Road. (R. 123.) The original 
owners of Lot 2, the Van Wagoners, understood that Oak Lane was a private road and 
used it only with permission. (R. 122-24, 128-130.) The Van Wagoners did not transfer 
any interest in Oak Lane to the subsequent owners of Lot 2. Id. The second owners of 
Lot 2, the Watkins, also understood that Oak Lane was a private road and used it only 
A true and correct copy of the Oak Lane II decision is included as Addendum B. 
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with permission. (R. 131-139.) The Griffins, the third owners of Lot 2. have 
occasionally used Oak Lane by driving and parking their vehicles on it. (R. 305.) 
In 2003, the owners of lots 1, 3, 4, and 5 formed the Association to maintain the 
physical and legal aspects of Oak Lane as a private lane. Id. at % 6. (R. 305.) As part of 
the formation of the Association, the seven original owners of the Oak Hills Subdivision 
transferred their interest in Oak Lane via a quitclaim deed to the Association. Id. at f 7. 
(R. 535-39.) The Griffins rejected the invitation to join the Association and the 
accompanying obligation to their share of the maintenance and upkeep of the lane, but 
continued to use Oak Lane for ingress and egress and for storage. Id, at j^ 6. In an effort 
to prevent the Griffins' unauthorized use of Oak Lane, the Association placed boulders on 
Oak Lane near Lot 2 in October and November 2003. Id. at ^ 7. (R. 305.) When the 
Griffins continued using Oak Lane without permission, the Association initiated the 
underlying action. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Oak Lane II, the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that the Griffins are entitled 
to a private easement over Oak Lane by virtue of a subdivision plat. The Court of 
Appeals' decision created a new type of easement in Utah - private easement by plat - the 
basis of which is an incorrect interpretation of Utah law. Specifically, the Oak Lane II 
court ignored three viable Utah court cases that carve out exceptions to the automatic per 
se private-easement-by-plat rule it created, and the secondary sources relied on by Oak 
J
 A true and correct copy of the Oak Hills Subdivision plat is included as Addendum C. 
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Lane II fail to provide the support for which they are cited. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals in Oak Lane II created new law in Utah in order to find that 
the Griffins had an easement over Oak Lane, a private road, by virtue of the Oak Hills 
Subdivision plat. This type of easement has not been previously recognized in Utah with 
respect to private roads, and the legal underpinnings and rationale relied on by Oak Lane 
II fail to support its creation of new law. 
L THE OAK LANE II COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED TUTTLE, 
AND IGNORED OTHER APPLICABLE UTAH CASES 
In ruling that Utah now recognizes a private easement on a private road based on 
the reference in an abutting landowners' deed to the subdivision plat, the only Utah law 
Oak Lane II court relied on (or analyzed) was Tuttle v. Sowadski, 41 Utah 501, 126 P. 
959 (1912). In focusing solely on Tuttle, the Oak Lane II court overlooked other, more 
recent Utah caselaw relevant to the present dispute, which provide valid and applicable 
legal principles that make the present dispute a poor choice upon which to create new 
Utah law. 
A. Oak Lane II Ignored Other Applicable Utah Cases 
The general rule in Utah is that a private easement arises on a public road abutting 
a landowner based on the road being dedicated to the public. Mason v. State of Utah, 656 
P.2d 465, 468 (Utah 1982) (holding, an abutting landowner has a private easement of 
ingress and egress to existing public highways."). The rationale for this general rule is 
that purchasers of property abutting an active public road rely on the fact that the road is 
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public and thus intended to benefit properties abutting the road. Carrier v. Lindquist 27 
P.3d 1112, 2001 UT 105,1J15; Boskovich v. Midvale City Corp., 243 P.2d 435, 448-49, 
121 Utah 445 (1952) (Wolfe, CJ., concurring). Thus, if a public road is subsequently 
vacated, abutting landowners still enjoy a private easement over the vacated road based 
on such reliance. The subsequent abandonment of the public road (and thus the public 
easement) has no effect on the surviving private easement enjoyed by abutting 
landowners. Gillmore v. Wright, 850 P.2d431, 437-38 (Utah 1993); see also Carrier v. 
Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112, 1118 (Utah 2001) (same); Mason, 656 P.2d at 468 ("This private 
easement of access has been held to survive the abandonment or vacation of the public 
highway5*) (citations omitted). Other Utah caselaw expand and elaborate on this general 
rule, and provide exceptions to the general rule that contravene the Oak Lane II decision. 
1. Oak Lane II Ignored Mason v. State of Utah 
The first Utah case overlooked by the Oak Lane II court is Mason v. State of Utah, 
656 P.2d 465 (Utah 1982), which involved a private easement over an abandoned public 
highway. Id. at 466. The Mason landowner conveyed a strip of his land to the State in 
1951 so that the State could build Highway 191. Twenty-five years later, the State 
abandoned the highway and thereafter intended to destroy the highway and sell the strip 
of land. Id. at 466. On appeal the abutting landowner claimed his private easement over 
the abandoned highway prohibited the State from destroying portions of the abandoned 
highway. Id. at 468. The Mason decision added a qualification to the general rule 
creating private easements over public roads. "Except where changed by statutes 
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pertaining to limited access highways, [citation omitted], an abutting landowner has a 
private easement of ingress and egress to existing public highways.'5 Id. at 468 (citations 
omitted). 
Mason thus qualified the general rule, and made it dependent on whether Utah 
statutes limiting access to highways applied. This shows that Mason did not view the 
general rule as an absolute per se rule, but that it had flexibility. Mason also shows that if 
the road in question is something less than a public road (i.e. public access is limited on 
the road thereby making the road quasi-private), a private easement fails to arise. In other 
words, there are some situations in which an abutting landowner will not automatically 
enjoy a private easement from a public road, regardless of his reliance. 
The Mason court further injected considerations of reasonableness into the 
application of the general rule: "Our interpretation of the abutting landowner's [private] 
easement of access as being subject to precedent requirements of reasonableness in the 
circumstances accords with what we consider the better-reasoned opinions on this 
subject." Id. at 469 (citations omitted). The Mason court concluded, "Thus, the abutting 
property owner has an easement over the abandoned highway only where (and to the 
extent that) it is 'necessary7 for ingress and egress' to and from the property under the 
standard established in Adney and elaborated here." Id. (emphasis added). Such 
reasonable considerations of necessary ingress and egress were ignored by the Oak Lane 
II court, which appeared to interpret the general rule creating a private easement as a per 
se rule. Had the Oak Lane II court factored necessary ingress and egress into its analysis, 
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it would have reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on the 
Association's testimony that the Griffins access their property along a driveway which 
connects their garage and property to a public road (High Bench Road). (R. 123, 141.) 
The Griffins thus do not need Oak Lane to as a necessary means of ingress to and egress 
from their property, and Oak Lane II erred by ignoring Mason's caveat to the general rule. 
Although no recorded subdivision plat was at issue in Mason, the abutting 
landowner in Mason had arguably more notice of his potential easement rights in the 
highway than the constructive notice provided by a reference in his deed to a recorded 
plat. See, e.g., Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev.. Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 
1279 (Utah 1998) (stating, "documents duly recorded according to the real estate title of 
the Utah Code impart constructive notice to all persons of their contents."). Better than 
constructive notice, the abutting landowner in Mason had actual notice of the public 
highway (and the easement rights attendant thereto) because he personally transferred the 
strip of land to the State on which the State constructed and maintained the highway. The 
abutting landowner in Mason thus had more notice of his potential easement rights than 
abutting landowners like the Griffins who rely only on constructive notice provided by 
deed references to a recorded plat. A plat distantly recorded in a county recorder's office, 
which likely goes unreviewed by most property buyers, provides less notice of abutting 
roads. By contrast, the abutting landowner in Mason had greater reliance and heightened 
notice based on his own transfer of the land that became the abutting public highway and 
his use of said highway. 
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2. Oak Lane II Ignored Evans v. Board of Cty Commissioners 
Another Utah case germane to the present dispute, and which went unnoticed by 
the Oak Lane II court, is Evans v. Board of Cty Commissioners, 97 P.3d 697, 2004 UT 
App 256. Evans initially cites Gillmore and Tuttle for the general rule that landowners 
abutting a public road acquire by operation of law a private easement of access to their 
property across the public road. Id. at 704 (citing Gillmore, 850 P.2d at 437; Tuttle, 126 
P. at 962). After further analyzing caselaw from other jurisdictions, the Evans court, 
citing Carrier, 27 P.3d 1112, 2001 UT 105, pulls back from the broad scope of the 
aforementioned general rule: "However, if the street, or streets, at issue were legally 
vacated prior to the property being purchased and the easement arising, the purchaser will 
not have a private easement right. See Carrier, 2001 UT 105 at *[[15." M- at 704. Evans 
then summarized this exception to the general rule: "a private easement over platted 
streets arises upon the purchase of property with reference to the plat map, so long as the 
roads have not been legally vacated prior to the purchase." Id. at 705. Thus, the Evans 
court carved out a significant limitation to the general rule based on the timing of the 
vacation of the public road. If the public road was vacated before the abutting landowner 
purchased the abutting property (and thus prior to the creation of the private easement 
running concurrently with the public easement over the public road), then the purchaser 
of the abutting property "will not have a private easement right." Id. 
Again, Evans's holding indicates at least two qualifications to the general rule. 
The first is that the general rule is not a per se, automatic rule that is immediately 
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triggered if a deed references a plat showing roads abutting properties in a subdivision. 
Second, and more importantly, the private easement expires as a matter of law if the 
public road is vacated (and thereby becomes a private road) prior to the abutting 
landowner's purchase of the abutting property. Viewed differently, once the public road 
was vacated in Evans, it became a private road, and thus no private easement-by-plat 
could arise. The present case is no different. Although no public easement previously 
applied to Oak Lane, there is no difference in the private road in Evans and the private 
road in the present case. According to Evans, the Oak Lane II court erred in granting a 
private easement over Oak Lane based on the plat. 
3. Oak Lane II Ignored Carrier v. Lindquist 
The Evans court made an issue of the timing of the abandonment of the public 
easement based on Carrier, supra. In Carrier, the court considered the timing of the 
abandonment of the public easement: ''Because the alley had not been legally vacated at 
the time of plaintiffs' purchase, the trial court was correct in finding that plaintiffs' 
reliance on the plat map entitles them to private easements over the alley abutting their 
properties as depicted on the plat map." Carrier, 2001 UT 105 at f^ 15. On this point the 
Carrier court distinguished Carrier from Tuttle, stating that the Tuttle plaintiff did not 
have a private easement across an adjoining landowner's property over a platted avenue 
because the public road had been vacated at the time the plaintiff purchased the property. 
Tuttle. 126 P. at 965. 
Based on Carrier, the Oak Lane II court erred in granting a private easement over 
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Oak Lane based on the recorded plat. In Carrier, the alley had not been vacated and thus 
the plaintiff was justified in relying on the plat map to create a private easement. Carrier, 
2001 UT 105 at ^15. Conversely, if the alley had been vacated at the time the plaintiff 
purchased the abutting lot, the Carrier court would have concluded that any reliance on 
the plat map for a private easement was unjustified. Such is the same situation the 
Griffins are in. Whether a previous public easement on Oak Lane had been vacated 
(thereby making it a private road) or whether it was a simple private road at the time the 
Griffms purchased their lot there is no difference. Either way Carrier mandates that as a 
private road at the time the Griffins purchase the abutting land, no private easement 
arises. 
4. The Exceptions Provided in Mason, Evans and Carrier Equally 
Apply to the Present Case 
Mason, Evans and Carrier - all three Utah cases - confirm that exceptions exist to 
the creation of a private easement on an abandoned public road. Specifically, if an 
abutting landowner purchases property abutting previously-abandoned public road or 
abutting a road covered by limited public easement (making the road quasi-private), the 
abutting landowner does not obtain a private easement in the abandoned road. These 
three Utah courts intuitively base their exceptions on the fact that at the time the abutting 
landowner purchases the property abutting the road, the road is no longer public, but is 
instead private. The fact that the abutting landowner's property and the road are platted 
and referenced in the abutting landowner's deed makes no difference to this exception. 
Such an exception makes sense. The abutting landowner, upon purchasing the 
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property abutting the road that was once public but is now private, cannot solely rely on 
the plat to conclude an easement exists on the road in question. According to the above 
caselaw, conversion of the public road into a private road extinguishes the automatic 
private easement championed by the Oak Lane II court. 
5. Oak Lane II Failed to Consider the Intent of the Original 
Grantors and Grantees 
Oak Lane II appeared to hedge on propounding an inflexible per se rule 
automatically creating a private easement for landowners abutting a private road based on 
the private road being depicted in a plat. Although Oak Lane IPs exception does not 
track along the same grounds as the exceptions in Mason, Evans and Carrier, Oak Lane II 
nonetheless appears to carve out an exception based on intent of the grantor and grantee, 
as well as the equities of the case: "the continued vitality of such an easement turns on the 
equities that exist at the time of conveyance. [Citation omitted]. . . . a part}7 would only 
have to plead and prove that such a right of use was intended to be covered by the grant 
or sale of the property based on documents relied on at the time of the conveyance, the 
parties' knowledge and intent, and the character or purpose of the road or common area at 
the time of the conveyance." Oak Lane II, 219 P.3d at 69. 
Notwithstanding this exception (which is based on an apparent concern for the 
intent of the original grantor and grantee of the abutting property). Oak Lane II ignored 
such trial testimony from the original developer-owners and the first predecessors-in-
interest of the Griffins (the Van Wagoners). The original developer-owners (grantors) 
and the Van Wagoners (grantees) all testified that they knew Oak Lane was private, they 
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the Van Wagoners did not intend to own any part of Oak Lane, and the Van Wagoners 
used Oak Lane by permission. (R. 122-24, 128-139.) Along with the Van Wagoners 
eschewing ownership in Oak Lane and using it by permission rather than by easement, the 
Van Wagoners were absolving themselves of all obligations of maintenance associated 
with Oak Lane. The Oak Lane II decision effectively strips grantees such as the Van 
Wagoners of such choice by automatically granting to them a private easement in an 
abutting road. 
In sum, Oak Lane IPs refusal to apply its own intent-based exception to the facts 
in dispute is perplexing because it sets forth the exception but fails to apply it. Clearly 
any such intent issue is factually-sensitive and creates a disputed issue of fact unworthy of 
an award of summary judgment. Oak Lane II thus erred in not reversing the trial court on 
this issue. 
B. Tlittle Provides the Basis for the General Rule that a Private Easement 
Arises Where a Public Easement Exists, But Otherwise Is Bad 
Precedent for Expanding a Private Easement to Cover Private Roads 
Oak Lane II based its creation of the new private easement on an old Utah case, 
Tuttle v. Sowadski, supra. In Turtle, the roadway in question was initially dedicated as a 
public road by virtue of a plat. Id. at 960-61. The Tuttle road was later deemed 
abandoned based on five years of nonuse as a public road. Id. at 961. In the years 
following the abandonment, the Tuttle appellants (the abutting landowners) began to use 
the roadway for "flower beds, and planted shrubbery thereon" and even erected a fence on 
the former roadway, which was maintained for more than 30 years. Id. Sometime 
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thereafter, the Tuttle respondents purchased property abutting the abandoned road and 
then subsequently sued the appellants for blocking access to their property via the 
abandoned road. Id. at 964-65. 
The Tuttle court recognized that a public easement is created by plat when a plat 
dedicates a road to the public, and also recognized that, at the same time, a private 
easement can arise by virtue of the plat, giving abutting landowners a private easement 
that can survive the extinguishment of the public easement. Id. However, Tuttle held that 
because the public road had been abandoned, a private easement in a non-existent public 
highway could not arise: 
There being no public highways or easement in existence when [the Tuttles] 
obtained their lots, no such easement could pass to them as appurtenant to the 
lots, nor could a private easement be created in a public highway because no 
such highway was in existence. 
Id. at 963. The same principal applies in the present dispute where no public 
easement was ever created over Oak Lane. In fact, the Oak Hills Subdivision plat 
clearly reflects the intention of the original grantors of preventing a public 
dedication, instead retaining the use of Oak Lane as a private lane. The Oak Lane 
II court completely ignored this critical fact. 
Despite the above quote from Tuttle. the Oak Lane II court found that Tuttle 
supports the creation of a new private easement in favor of abutting landowners, 
regardless of whether a public easement ever existed. Oak Lane IL 219 P.3d at 70. 
Though the Oak Lane II court acknowledges that the "Tuttle court clearly recognized that 
an independent private right arises when a public right to use a street has been created by 
18 
a plat/' it saw "no reason why such a right, regardless of the characterization of such 
right would not also arise when a person purchases a lot with reference to a recorded plat 
showing private roadways instead of public roadways." Id. at ^ 17. In other words, Oak 
Lane IPs justification for the new easement law in Utah is: there }s no reason not to. 
In addition to its no-reason-not-to rationale, Oak Lane II weakly suggests that the 
Griffins' deed referencing a recorded plat provides some kind of additional, heightened 
notice to the potential buyer of the abutting property that the plats depiction of a road 
abutting the property being purchase provides the potential purchaser a private easement. 
This cryptic rationale, however, ignores the reality and practicalities of landowners 
purchasing a property, especially a property7 in a subdivision. Common sense indicates 
that potential homebuyers inspect the property they are interested in purchasing. Such 
potential buyers walk around the property, walk through it, walk over the drive way, etc. 
They also likely observe the street their driveway empties onto. Although such hands-on 
due diligence provides a potential buyer far more notice of abutting streets, access and 
egress than a distantly-recorded plat, Oak Lane II nonetheless indicates that constructive 
notice provided by a plat governs over actual observation and actual notice provided by a 
property inspection. According to Oak Lane II, potential homebuyers rely more on a 
4
 The Oak Lane II court discusses the reference in the Griffins' deed to easements of record. 
Specifically, the deed vesting title in lot 2 to the Griffins provides that the deed is "Subject to 
easements, covenants, conditions and restrictions of record." However, clearly this reference to 
easements is to easements and other encumbrances existing on lot 2, not any private easement 
existing on neighboring property or abutting private roads. Thus, the Griffins and the Oak Lane 
II court are misplaced if they interpret the reference to "easements" in the Griffins' deed as 
strengthening the Griffins' claim to a private easement along Oak Lane. Such an interpretation is 
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recorded plat than an actual inspection and physical investigation of the property to be 
purchased. 
This point is critical to the present case because when the Griffins purchased their 
property, they knew based on a drive up to the house that the property's driveway 
stemmed from High Bench Road. (R. 141.)- They had to notice that although the 
property abutted Oak Lane, Oak Lane provided the property no drive way, entry way or 
paved means of access to the garage or front of the house. They should have thus 
discerned that their property was not intended to be accessed from Oak Lane. The Oak 
Lane II court overlooked such realities and practicalities of accessing the Griffins' 
property, and the Griffins' actual knowledge thereof, but instead concluded that the 
Griffins' garnered greater reliance from the constructive notice provided by their deed's 
reference to a plat recorded at the county recorder's office. Finding that such constructive 
notice trumps actual notice makes no sense in light of the absence of evidence provided 
by the Griffins indicating that they actually relied on the reference in their deed to the 
plat, or that they actually reviewed the plat prior to purchasing their property. 
Perhaps most galling about Oak Lane II, is the inequitable and unfair result where 
abutting landowners like the Griffins can take advantage of and use another's private road 
for their own benefit and enjoyment, and then refuse to provide their share of the 
maintenance and upkeep of the private road. Such is all the Association has ever wanted 
- if the Griffins use Oak Lane then they should help shoulder a proportion of the costs of 
misplaced and takes the '"easements5* reference out of context. 
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maintenance and upkeep. Oak Lane II effectively saddles the Association with the 
burden of covering the Griffins' share of the costs of maintenance and upkeep. Adding 
insult to injury, Oak Lane II ignores the fact that the Griffins use Oak Lane 
notwithstanding the availability to them of another road - a public road - by which the 
Griffins can easily obtain ingress to and egress from their property. 
C. The Oak Lane II Court Fails to Justify its Departure from Utah's 
Traditional Four-Easement Structure 
Utah law recognizes four, and only four, types of easements. These four 
r r n o 
easements are express , implied , prescriptive , and necessity . See Potter, 1999 UT App 
95 at [^8. These four types of easements have been recognized under Utah law for 
decades and have express and settled requirements. The Oak Lane II court does not 
suggest we should abandon this traditional four-easement structure, which serves Utah 
well. It is only because the Griffins fail to fall wdthin one of these four types of easement 
that they have created a new, fifth type of easement in Utah. Yet the Griffins provide no 
rationale why this Court should abandon this traditional four-easement structure, other 
5
 An express easement is the most common type of easement and it is "expressly created 
between two parties in a land transaction or conveyance by an express grant or an express 
reservation." Potter, 1999 UT App 95 at \9. 
6
 Under Utah law, an easement by implication requires: (1) that unity of title was followed by 
severance; (2) that the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible at the time of severance; (3) 
that the easement was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and (4) that 
the use of the easement was continuous rather than sporadic. Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150, 1152 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
7
 To establish a prescriptive easement a party must show "a use that is (1) open, (2) notorious, (3) 
adverse, and (4) continuous for at least twenty years." Potter, 1999 UT App 95 at \ 17. 
o 
An easement by necessity arises '"when there is a conveyance of part of a tract of land which is 
so situated that either the part conveyed or the part retained is surrounded with no access to a 
road to the outer world.'" Potter, 1999 UT App 95 at |18 (citation omitted). 
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than it would be convenient for them to be able to use Oak Lane to occasionally park a 
trailer or boat. The Oak Lane II court translated the Griffins' justification into the 
rationale found in Oak Lane II - there's no reason not to create a private easement by plat 
in Utah. Such reasoning and justification fails to rise to the level to justify upsetting this 
well-settled easement law in Utah, and is a shaking foundation upon which to base a new 
easement. 
II. OAK LANE IPS RELIANCE ON SECONDARY SOURCES IS 
MISPLACED AND UNPERSUASIVE 
Other than its sole reliance on Tuttle (for Utah law), Oak Lane II heavily relies on 
secondary sources to justify its expansion of Tuttle to create private easements to abutting 
landowners over private roads. Specifically, Oak Lane II relies on four secondary sources 
to support its creation of the new private easement-by-plat: (a) the treatise Utah Real 
Property Law. (b) 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property, (c) the 
treatise Thompson on Real Property and (d) the treatise Powell on Real Property. Oak 
Lane IPs reliance on such secondary sources, however, is misplaced. 
A. Utah Real Property Law 
Oak Lane II cites David A. Thomas & James H. Backman, Utah Real Property 
Law, claiming that this treatise "interpreted Utah's case law in the same way." Oak Lane 
II, 219 P.3d at 69. Specifically, Oak Lane II quotes Utah Real Property Law for the 
following proposition: "w[w]hen an owner subdivides property in accordance with a map 
(or plat or plan), a purchaser . . . of a lot within the subdivision acquires an easement over 
private streets as laid out on the map even if the easement is not expressly created in the 
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documents of conveyance5" Id (quoting Utah Real Property Law § 12.02(b)(2)(iii). at 
438 (2008)) (see excerpt in Addendum D in the Appendix). However, this statement in 
Utah Real Property Law (quoted by Oak Lane II) contains no citation or reference. It is 
thus unsupported by any Utah caselaw. Such can hardly provide Oak Lane II the 
justification for expanding easement law in Utah. Nor can such a secondary source with 
no caselaw support stand up to scrutiny on appeal. 
Oak Lane II further quotes Utah Real Property Law: "'[I]mplied easements arise 
from the circumstances of a transaction or the circumstances surrounding the properties 
involved. Courts are willing to imply an easement because they are convinced that the 
parties intended to create an easement based on the circumstances accompanying a 
conveyance of property. The court thereby brings into existence the results of the 
perceived, unexpressed intent of the parties derived from the facts of the situation/5' Oak 
Lane IL 219 P.3d at 69 (quoting Utah Real Property Law 12.02(b)(2) at 436 (2008)). 
Oak Lane II, however, ignored verbiage three paragraphs later in the same section of 
Utah Real Property Law, wrhich states: "Strict rules apply to the creation of implied 
easements because they are not specifically mentioned in the recorded documents 
applying to the affected properties. Fairness to subsequently affected third parties 
demands that implied easements should arise only under convincing and compelling 
circumstances/5 Utah Real Property Law § 12.02(b)(2) at 436 (2008). Thus, to the 
extent this Court is willing to analogize a private easement over a private lane to an 
implied easement (as Oak Lane II appeared to do with its second quote from Utah Real 
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Property Law), the strict rules accompanying application of implied easements, fairness 
to other affected parties, and convincing and compelling circumstances must also apply.9 
Finally, notwithstanding Oak Lane IPs extensive analysis of Tuttle and reliance on 
Utah Real Property Law to justify extending Tuttle to private roads, Oak Lane II failed to 
notice that Utah Real Property Law's section on easements by plat failed to cite Tuttle for 
its suggestion that private easements should be extended over private lanes. In fact, 
nowhere in the easement section of Utah Real Property Law is there a reference to Tuttle. 
Utah Real Property Law thus hardly provides the clear legal support for a private-
easement-by-plat, as Oak Lane II leads one to believe. 
B. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property §21 
Oak Lane IPs next secondary source cited as justification for its extension of 
Tuttle is 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property §21, from which Oak 
Lane II quotes: 
Generally, where property sold is described in the conveyance with reference to a 
plat or map on which streets, alleys, parks, and other open areas are shown, an 
easement therein is entitled, and exists entirely independent of dedication to a 
public use. . . . An easement will be implied from a map or plat only if it was 
intended by the parties, and no easement can be implied where the grantor has no 
interest in the roads reflected on the pl[a]t map/' 
25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property §21, at 519-20 (2004) 
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (see excerpt in Addendum E in the Appendix). 
9
 Utah Real Property law states that implied easements are created by circumstances of the 
transaction or surrounding parties involved, and easements must be reasonably necessary for the 
enjoyment of the dominant parcel. Utah Real Property Law^ § 12.02(b)(2) at 437. 
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This private-easement-by-plat rule is not a per se automatic rule - i.e. if a deed references 
a plat that shows a private road abutting a lot, then the abutting lot owner automatically 
has a private easement over the private road. Instead, this rule is subject to the intent of 
the parties (as emphasized in the quote above). Thus, according to this secondary source, 
courts do not just stop at the grantee's deed and the plat map, but instead look into what 
the original grantor and original grantee intended.10 
As explained above, the original developers and owners of lot 2 intended to keep 
Oak Lane private, intended to allow lot 2's owners to use it by permission only, and 
intended to keep ownership of Oak Lane from lot 2's owners. At the very least, such 
issues of intent are no proper for summary judgment. 
C. 7 Thompson on Real Property 
Oak Lane II also relies on 7 Thompson on Real Property to justify its extension of 
Utah law: 
'A developer's sale of lots in a subdivision according to a recorded plat creates 
private easement rights in favor of purchasers in any area set apart for their use.' 
Those rights. . . exist whether purchasers have given consideration for the 
property's higher value by paying a higher price. Even where the dedication by 
plat or map is not formally accepted by the appropriate authorities, persons who 
rely on the plat in making a purchase acquire an interest akin to an easement 
appurtenant in the rights of way.' 
Oak Lane II 219 P.3d at 70 (quoting 7 Thompson on Real Property §60.03(a)(3)(iii), at 
Further, American Jurisprudence on Deeds contradicts this American Jurisprudence on 
Easements and Licenses: "Reference to a map in a conveyance normally is utilized merely as a 
descriptive tool to identify the property and, therefore, does not itself convey." 23 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Deeds §232. 
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480-81) (emphasis added) (see excerpt in Addendum F in the Appendix). Two sentences 
later in Thompson, it states: "this right applies to all members of the subdivision who 
purchased in reliance on the plat or plan, not merely those with property abutting the 
easement.'* 7 Thompson on Real Property §60.03(a)(3)(iii), at 281 (emphasis added). 
Thus, Tlwmpson does not espouse a per se automatic rule providing a private easement to 
landowners abutting a private road referenced on a plat. Instead, Thompson requires the 
purchaser (i.e. Griffms) to provide evidence that they relied on the plat's reference to the 
private road (i.e. Oak Lane). 
The Oak Lane II court fails to cite any such evidence in support of the Griffins' 
supposed reliance on the subdivision plat and to the extent they provided any such 
evidence, the issue of reliance would be a disputed issue of fact improper for summary 
judgment. 
D. Powell on Real Property 
Oak Lane II also relies on 4 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 34.06 
for the following: 
'Where a conveyance of land describes the parcel as bounded by a street 
designated in the conveyance, or refers to a map on which spaces for streets, parks, 
or other common uses are shown, but the conveyance says nothing about the 
creation of an easement or a dedication to a public use, the conveyee of the land 
acquires an easement with respect to the street or the areas shown on the map. 
Oak Lane IT 21 P.3d at 70 (quoting 4 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 
34.06, at 34-40 to 34-41) (see excerpt in Addendum G in the Appendix). Powell 
essentially restates the general rule set forth above, but is based on caselaw from other 
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states. In relying on such non-Utah caselaw, Powell fails to take into consideration the 
exceptions carved out by Utah caselaw such as Mason, Evans and Carrier. As set forth 
above, Mason, Evans and Carrier cut back on the per se automatic rule stated in Powell, 
and establish exceptions that apply to the present case. Accordingly, Powell provides 
poor support for Oak Lane IFs expansion of Utah's private easement law. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Court of 
Appeals' decision in Oak Lane II, in as much as it inappropriately creates a new-
automatic private easement by plat unsupported by Utah law, and remand this case for 
further consideration in light of the correct law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of February 2010. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC 
Steven Quesenberry y^ 
J. Bryan Quesenberry/^ 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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SHAWN D, TURNER (5813) of Utah County State of Ulah 
LARSON. TURNER, DALBY & ETHINGTON, L.C.
 f 7 A,, £ - , » ^ 
121S West South Jordan Parkway, Suits B -J-J^^LfZU ^LL_DBpulv 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
(§01)446-6464 
FN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OAK LANE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
DENNIS L. GRIFFIN and RENAE GRIFFIN; 
Defendants 
DENNIS L. GRIFFIN and RENAE GRIFFIN, 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs, 
v. 
OAK LANE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION; 
Cou n terc 1 a i m Defen dant 
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
I Civil No, 030405130 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
1 
This matter came before the Court on October ], 2007 for hearing on Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs were present and represented by their counsel Stephen Quesenberry. 
Defendant P.enae Griffin was present as was Griffins' counsel Shawn D, Turner. 
The Court having read the pleadings related to this matter filed by the respective parties and having 
heard oral argument as presented by respective counsel it hereby finds as follows: 
] 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The AlpineCity Council approved and accepted the Oak Hills Haven plat which contained five lots, 
on January >35 1977. 
in the Owners' Dedication section of the plat all of the original Gwners of the land executed a secncr 
which reads' 
KNOW ALL MEN 3Y THESE PRESENTS THAT WE, ALL OF THE UNDERSIGNED 
OWNERS OF ALL OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATE 
HEREOF AND SHOWN ON THIS WAP, HAVE CAUSED THE SAME TO 3E SUBDIVIDED 
INTO LOTS, BLOCKS, STREETS AND EASEMENTS AND DO HEREBY DEDICATE THE 
STREETS AND OTHER PUBLIC AREAS AS INDICATED HEREON FOR PERPETUAL USE. 
OF THE PUBLIC, 
The portion of the Dedication beginning with "AND DO HEREBY" and continuing thereafter to the 
crosses OUT on tne pjaL 
Tht plai clearly identifies Oak Lane as a "Private Lane'*. 
Tne Oak Hills Haven Subdivision consists of five lots 
Defendants, Dennis and ReNae Griffin own Lot 2 of the Oak Hills Haven Subdivision. 
The Griffins purchased the property in 1988, 
For almost sixteen years, and until October of 2003, the Griffins accessed their home on Lot 2 on a 
nearly daily basis by using Oak Lane, the cu) de sac m the Oak Hills Haven SUbdivisjon. 
In 2003 all of the other lot owners in theSubriivision formed the Oak Lane Homeowners Association 
On or about Ji]y 22,2003. the Association obtained a quit eiann deed from the original owners of the 
\Qt$ in the subdK jsicm to the property compHsmg the voad 
Baser sclelv on this ci'j't claim oeed, the Piamhff claims evmersb'p of the ~oad 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff has standee to bnng its aet'on m this merer 
When fie Oak Lane Subcm sion was cheated an easement was cheated o e^* the private lane. 
o 
contained in the subdivision, for a!) those property owners who abut the lane. 
3. The Griffins are property owners whose property abuts the Jane. 
4. The Griffins property-was sold to them by reference to the recorded Plat and their property is 
described by reference to that plat, 
5. The Griffins have an easement, for access, ingrtss and egress from Oak Lane to their property, 
Dated this,-£/day of December, 2007. 
BY THE COURT J^^S^m^rO 
HoiyPred D. Howard | K | ^ ^ ^ ^ - | ; jf 
District -Court Judge % ^ S ^ ^ ^ i S (F 
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Oak Lane Homeowners Association, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Dennis L. Griffin and Renae Griffin, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 20080084-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2009 UT App 248; 219 P.3d 64; 638 Utah Adv. Rep. 26; 2009 Utah App. LEXIS 268 
September 11 , 2009, Filed 
PRIOR HISTORY: [ * * * 1 ] 
rourth District, Provo Department, 030405130. The Honorable Fred D. Howard. 
Dak Lane Homeowners Ass'n v. Griffin, 153 P.3d 740, 2006 UT App 465, 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 507 (2006) 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant homeowners association claimed ownership of a lane. The Fourth 
District, Provo Department, Utah, entered a summary judgment ruling in favor of appellee property 
owners. 
OVERVIEW: The subdivision was platted showing five lots abutting the lane. One of the lots was 
accessible from the lane as well as from a roadway. The owners of the other lots formed the association 
to manage the maintenance and landscaping of the lane. The original owners of the platted lots quit-
claimed their interests in the lane to the association. The association subsequently placed boulders on 
the lane to prevent the property owners from using the lane. The association argued that the trial court 
erred when it determined that the property owners had an easement by plat to use the lane to access 
their property. The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not err in granting the summary 
judgment because Utah case law fully supported the determination that a right to use the lane to access 
the property owners' lot arose in favor of the property owners when their deed referenced the recorded 
plat showing that their lot abutted the lane, given that the lane was used as a road to access lots within 
the subdivision at the t ime the property owners' purchased the lot. Summary judgment was appropriate 
because none of the disputed facts identified by the association were material. 
OUTCOME: The appellate court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment ruling. 
CORE TERMS: easement, plat, lane, street, roadway, landowner, recorded, map, private easement, 
conveyance, deed, summary judgment, abut, right to use, ownership, abutting, abandoned, common 
areas, platted, original owners, right of use, referenced, purchaser, acquire, grantee, abutting owners, 
appurtenant, continuous, case law, material facts 
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moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When reviewing 
a grant of summary judgment an appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness. More Like This Headnote 
Real Property Law > Adioining Landowners > Easements W 
HN2^under Utah law, landowners whose property abuts public streets, alleys, and public ways that 
appear on a plat map are entitled to a private easement over those public 
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Real Property Law > Deeds > Property Descriptions **±L 
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dedicates the street to the public, then a person whose land abuts the platted street obtains 
both a public and private easement. The private easement, which is independent of the public 
easement, can survive if the public easement is abandoned or vacated, but only if the two 
easements were once held contemporaneously. This private easement is appurtenant to the 
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surrounding the properties involved. Courts are willing to imply an easement because they are 
convinced that the parties intended to create an easement based on the circumstances 
accompanying a conveyance of property. The court thereby brings into existence the results of 
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on which streets, alleys, parks, and other open areas are shown, an easement therein is created 
in favor of the grantee. Such an easement is deemed a part of the property to which the grantee 
is entitled, and exists entirely independent of dedication to a public use. An easement will be 
implied from a map or plat only if it was intended by the parties, and no easement can be 
implied where the grantor has no interest in the roads reflected on the plat 
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HN7±Where a conveyance of land describes the parcel as bounded by a street designated in the 
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OPIN ION BY: Gregory K. Orme ^ 
OPIN ION 
[ * * 6 6 ] ORME ^ Judge: 
[ * P 1 ] Oak Lane Homeowners Association (the Association) appeals a summary judgment ruling in favor 
of Dennis L. and Renae Griffin. More specifically, the Association claims that the trial court created a new 
type of easement, "an easement by plat," which is not recognized in Utah. Further, the Association urges 
that there are three material facts in dispute relating to the use, ownership, and nature of the private 
roadway in question. We affirm the grant of summary judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
[ * P 2 ] In 1977, the Oak Hills Subdivision was platted, showing five lots that abutted Oak Lane. Lots 1, 3, 
4, and 5 were accessible only by way of Oak Lane, but lot 2 was accessible from Oak Lane as well as from a 
public roadway. x The plat initially included the following language: 
Know all men by these presents that we, all of the undersigned owners of all of the property 
described in the surveyor's [ * * * 2 ] certificate hereon and shown on this map, have caused the 
same to be subdivided into lots, blocks, streets and easements and do hereby dedicate the 
streets and other public areas as indicated hereon for perpetual use of the public. 
FOOTNOTES 
I The Association points out that the driveway on lot 2 runs only from the public road. 
[ * P 3 ] The original seven owners of the five lots signed the plat, after crossing out the portion of the 
above language that dedicated the streets and other public areas to the public, so that it read as follows: 
Know all men by these presents that we, all of the undersigned owners of all of the property 
described in the surveyor's certificate hereon and shown on the map, have caused the same to 
be subdivided into lots, blocks, streets and easements. 
The Alpine City Council accepted the plat, also deleting from its resolution language about accepting the 
dedication, and the plat was recorded in 1977. Both sides and the trial court correctly infer that, under 
these circumstances, Oak Lane remained a private roadway. 
[ * P 4 ] One year before the subdivision was created, the Van Wagoners purchased the land that became 
lot 2 and, as original owners, signed the plat. Seven years later, they sold [ * * * 3 ] lot 2 to the Watkinses, 
who lived there for approximately five years. The Association submitted affidavits from both the Van 
Wagoners and the Watkinses reciting that they "understood that Oak Lane was a private road and used it 
only with permission." 
[ * P 5 ] The Griffins are the third owners of lot 2, having purchased the property in 1988. Their deed 
references the 1977 subdivision plat and states that they obtained title to the property "[s]ubject to 
easements, covenants, conditions and restrictions of record." 
[ * P 6 ] In 2003, the owners of lots 1, 3, 4, and 5 formed the Association to manage the maintenance and 
landscaping of Oak Lane. As alleged in one landowner's affidavit, the other lot owners "invited the Griffins 
to jo in the [Association because they were using Oak Lane by permission without sharing any of the on-
going expenses," but the Griffins did not want to join. The affidavit states that "Mrs. Griffin . . . refused to 
join . . . , refused to pay for anything, and asserted her intent to continue using Oak Lane." 
[ * * 6 7 ] [ *P7] The original owners of the platted lots quit-claimed their interests in Oak Lane to the 
Association. The Association accordingly claims ownership of Oak Lane. The Association 
[ * * * 4 ] subsequently placed boulders on Oak Lane to prevent the Griffins from using the lane. 
[ * P 8 ] In its ruling on summary judgment, the trial court determined that "[w]hen the Oak Lane 
Subdivision was created, an easement was created over the private lane, contained in the subdivision, for 
all those property owners who abut the lane." Because " [ t ]he Griffins are property owners whose property 
abuts the lane," and because "[ t ]he Gnffms['] property was sold to them by reference to the recorded Plat 
and [described] their property . . . by reference to that plat," the trial court concluded that "[ t ]he Griffins 
have an easement, for access, ingress and egress from Oak Lane to their property." The Association 
appeals from this ruling. 2 
FOOTNOTES 
2 This is the Association's second appeal in this matter. See Oak Lane Homeowners Ass'n v. Griffin, 
2006 UT App 465, 153 P.3d 740. The Association was successful in having an earlier adverse summary 
judgment reversed. See id. PP 1, 10. 
SSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[ * P 9 ] The Association challenges the trial court's summary judgment ruling on both legal and factual 
jrounds. ^ ^ P u r s u a n t to rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an order granting summary 
udgment is sustainable [ * * * 5 ] "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
)n file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
hat the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56fc). "[W]hen 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment' we give 'no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law: 
hose conclusions are reviewed for correctness.'" Oak Lane Homeowners Ass'n v. Griffin, 2006 UT App 465, 
> 6, 153 P.3d 740 (quoting Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 2 1 , P 7, 44 P.3d 704), 
\NALYSIS 
. The Trial Court's Legal Ruling Is Correct 
[ * P 1 0 ] The Association first challenges the summary judgment ruling on the ground that the trial court 
>rred when it determined that the Griffins had an "easement by plat" to use Oak Lane to access their 
)roperty. The Association is simply wrong to the extent it alleges that Utah does not recognize easement 
ights in landowners whose property abuts roads referenced in recorded plat. As indicated in Carrier v. 
Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, 37 P.3d 1112, H /*2 ,?"[u]nder Utah law, landowners whose property abuts public 
streets, alleys, and public ways that appear on a plat map are entitled to [ * * * 6 ] a private easement over 
those public ways." Id. P 12. 
[ * P 1 1 ] We acknowledge that Utah case law has not specifically addressed whether an easement in a 
private roadway arises based on a deed's reference to a plat showing that a landowner's property abuts a 
private roadway. However, HAf5"?Utah's jurisprudence readily supports the general proposition that a right 
of use may arise when property is purchased or otherwise transferred with reference to a recorded plat 
describing streets or common areas within a subdivision. The reasoning in Tuttie v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 
126 P. 959 (1912), while specifically addressing the rights of the owners of property abutting a once-public 
street, supports a conclusion that persons who purchase property, which property along with abutting 
roadways are identified in a recorded plat, may obtain a right to use such roadways based on the 
circumstances surrounding their acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the roadway is public or 
private. 
[ * P 1 2 ] In Tuttie, the respondents, who owned property abutting what had been identified on the plat as 
Wabash Avenue, sought to have the appellant, Helen Sowadzki, remove materials that blocked the street. 
See id. at 960, 962. [ * * * 7 ] The respondents alleged that they held a private easement of access, which 
could not be abandoned by the public or taken without compensation based on the original owner "platting 
the land into blocks and lots which abut upon streets, and in selling such lots with reference to such plat." 
[ * * 6 8 ] Id. at 962. The respondents claimed their private right of access could be enforced against other 
abutting landowners, including Sowadzki, even though the other landowners were not the original 
developer who had platted and sold the lots with reference to the plat, because "every owner was 
compelled to keep the avenue open so that every other owner might perpetually enjoy his easement." Id. 
at 964-65. 
[ * P 1 3 ] The recorded plat, filed in 1891, identified Wabash Avenue as a street and dedicated it to the 
public. See id. at 960-61 . In a prior related case, the Utah Supreme Court determined that Wabash Avenue 
had been abandoned as a public roadway due to a statute permitting abandonment following five years of 
non-use. See id. Because Wabash Avenue had never actually been used as a roadway, it was abandoned in 
1896 as a public road, leaving a private easement that ran with Sowadzki's property. 3 See id. at 951-62, 
965. 
FOOTNOTES 
3 Sowadzki's [ * * * 8 ] acts and intentions showed she abandoned her private easement, as such, but 
the Court determined that tit le to a portion of the intended street reverted to her as an abutting 
landowner. See Tuttie v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501 , 126 P. 959, 965 (1912). Cf. Sears v. Op den City, 572 
P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1977) ("[T]he interest a municipal body acquires in the streets in a platted 
subdivision is a determinable fee. Upon vacation by the governing authorities, the fee reverts to the 
abutting property owner."). 
[ * P 1 4 ] The Utah Supreme Court discussed Utah law regarding easements created by plats. See id. at 
962-65. H /V4?Under Utah law, when an owner creates a plat that clearly identifies a street and then sells 
the property that abuts the street by referencing the plat, the purchaser of the lot acquires a right that 
prevents the original owner from vacating or obstructing the street. See id. at 962. When the recorded plat 
dedicates the street to the public, then a person whose land abuts the platted street obtains both a public 
and private easement. See id. The private easement, which is independent of the public easement, can 
survive if the public easement is abandoned or vacated, but only if the two easements [ * * * 9 ] were once 
held contemporaneously. See id. at 962, 964. This private easement is appurtenant to the property and 
"constitutes a property right which can only be taken from [the affected owners] or obstructed by making 
proper compensation." Id. at 962. 
[ * P 1 5 ] Because the Tuttie respondents claimed rights against another person whose property abutted 
the street, Sowadzki, instead of against the original landowner who recorded the plat, the Court also 
addressed what rights abutting lot owners have as against one another. See id. at 963-65. The Court 
acknowledged that even if a street was abandoned as a public street, abutting owners may not obstruct the 
street so that other abutting owners may not use it. See id. at 963. The rights of abutting owners as 
against each other are based upon equitable principles. See id. at 963-64. In determining whether equity 
justif ied an abutting owner's right to use the street, the Court considered the circumstances that existed at 
the time the abutting owner purchased his or her property. See id. at 964. 
[ * P 1 6 ] The Tuttle court determined that Sowadzki initially had a private easement to use the designated 
street that survived its abandonment by the public. See Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 126 P. 959, 964-
65 (1912). [ * * * 1 0 ] However, it was clear from Sowadzki's actions, i.e., building a fence and planting a 
garden and shrubs in the area earmarked as a street and never using the designated street as a method of 
ingress or egress, that any private easement for access had clearly been abandoned by the time the Tuttle 
respondents purchased their property. See id. at 961, 963, 965. Because they had purchased their lots 
many years after Wabash Avenue had been abandoned as a public roadway, from someone other than the 
original owner who platted the property, and they had clear notice at the time they purchased their 
property that no actual roadway existed, the Court found it inequitable to grant them any easement in the 
area once intended to be Wabash Avenue. See id. at 963-65. See also Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, PP 
14-15, 37 P.3d 1112 (distinguishing Tuttle and concluding that the landowners had a private easement in a 
roadway when the [ * * 6 9 ] roadway had been vacated by the public only after they had purchased their 
property). 
[ * P 1 7 ] The Tuttle court clearly recognized that an independent private right arises when a public right to 
use a street has been created by a plat. See 126 P. at 962, 964. We see no reason [ * * * l i ] why such a 
right, regardless of the characterization of such right, 4 would not also arise when a person purchases a lot 
with reference to a recorded plat showing private roadways instead of public roadways. The same principle-
-that land purchasers should be able to expect that a street identified in a referenced plat is what it 
ourports to be in the plat, i.e., a street by which to access their property—still applies. Accordingly, as long 
3S a roadway is still in use as a roadway at the time a lot is purchased, something "tangible" at the time 
:he property was purchased on which to base the right of access would exist, id. at 963, and it would be 
nequitable to deprive a lot owner of such a right years later, as the Association is trying to do in this case. 
'.n Tuttle, if the avenue had been used as a private roadway by Sowadzki at the time the respondents 
purchased their lots, the Supreme Court's reasoning indicates that the outcome would have been different 
because in such a situation, the equities that were lacking in Tuttle would clearly have been manifest. See 
d. at 963-64. 
FOOTNOTES 
4 While the easement or right that arises is in some ways similar to an implied easement, it is also 
arguably [ * * * 1 2 ] an express easement based on the reference to the plat in the conveyance or grant 
of the property. See 4 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 34.06, at 34-41 to 34-43 (Michael 
Allan Wolf ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2000) ("In one sense such an easement is created by 
express conveyance, since one can construe the reference in the deed to the bounding street or to the 
underlying map as representing the easement. The fact remains, however, that the easement exists 
because of the combined effect of a referential phrase in the conveyance and of the circumstances of 
the conveyance. Some courts, therefore, speak of such an easement as arising from 'implication.'") 
(footnotes omitted). See also 25 Am. Jur, 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 2 1 , at 519-20 
(2004) (indicating that different jurisdictions characterize the rights resulting from reference to a plat 
differently, with "the 'broad' view . . . designating it] as an easement, to the use of all the streets and 
alleys delineated on the map or plat"; the "'intermediate' view, referred to as the 'beneficial' or the 
'complete enjoyment' rule, [holding] that the extent of the grantee's private right . . . is limited to 
[ * * * 1 3 ] such [uses] as are reasonably or materially beneficial to the grantee and of which the 
deprivation would reduce the value of his or her lot"; and "the 'narrow' view, sometimes referred to as 
the 'necessary1 rule, [holding] that the private right . . . is limited to the abutting street and such others 
as are necessary to give him access to a public highway") (footnotes omitted). 
Further, as shown in Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501 , 126 P, 959 (1912), the continued vitality of such 
an easement turns on the equities that exist at the time of conveyance. See id. at 962-63. Accordingly 
when pleading and proving that an easement arose based on reference to a plat, a party would not 
necessarily be required to plead and prove the elements of one of the typical easements, i.e., an 
easement by necessity, implication, prescription, or expression, as the Association suggests in its brief. 
Rather, in accordance with Tuttle and our opinion in this case, a party would only have to plead and 
prove that such a right of use was intended to be covered by the grant or sale of the property based on 
documents relied on at the time of the conveyance, the parties' knowledge and intent, and the character 
or [ * * * 1 4 ] purpose of the road or common area at the time of the conveyance. 
[ *P18 ] We further note that a leading treatise on Utah real property law has interpreted Utah's case law 
in the same way. See David A. Thomas & James H. Backman, Utah Real Property Law § 12.02(b)(2)(i i i ) , at 
438 (2008) (stating that n [w]hen an owner subdivides property in accordance with a map (or plat or plan), 
a purchaser . . . of a lot within the subdivision acquires an easement over private streets as laid out on the 
map even if the easement is not expressly created in the documents of conveyance"); see also id. § 12.02 
(b)(2), at 436 (H A / 5?"[ I ]mpl ied easements arise from the circumstances of a transaction or the 
circumstances surrounding the properties involved. Courts are willing to imply an easement because they 
are convinced that the parties intended to create an easement based on the circumstances accompanying a 
conveyance of property. The court thereby brings into existence the results of the perceived, unexpressed 
intent of the parties derived from the facts of the situation.") (footnote omitted). Additionally, the majority 
view recognizes the existence of easements in favor of landowners whose property abuts private roadways 
[ * * * 1 5 ] referenced in a plat. See 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 2 1 , at 519-
20 [ * * 7 0 ] (2004) (H/v6?"Generally, where property sold is described in the conveyance with reference to 
a plat or map on which streets, alleys, parks, and other open areas are shown, an easement therein is 
created in favor of the grantee. Such an easement is deemed a part of the property to which the grantee is 
entit led, and exists entirely independent of dedication to a public use. . . . An easement will be implied from 
a map or plat only if it was intended by the parties, and no easement can be implied where the grantor has 
no interest in the roads reflected on the pl [a] t map.") (footnotes omit ted); 4 Richard R. Powell, Powell on 
Real Property § 34.06, at 34-40 to 34-41 (Michael Allan Wolf, ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2008) (HN7 
?"Where a conveyance of land describes the parcel as bounded by a street designated in the conveyance, 
or refers to a map on which spaces for streets, parks, or other common uses are shown, but the 
conveyance says nothing about the creation of an easement or a dedication to a public use, the conveyee of 
the land acquires an easement with respect to the street or the areas shown [ * * * 1 6 ] on the map.") 
(footnotes omitted); 7 Thompson on Real Property § 60.03(a)(3)( i i i ) , at 480-81 (David A. Thomas, ed., 
2006) (HN8+n,/\ developer's sale of lots in a subdivision according to a recorded plat creates private 
easement rights in favor of purchasers in any area set apart for their use.' Those rights . . . exist whether 
or not there has ever been acceptance by public authorities or the public generally, on the ground that the 
purchasers have given consideration for the property's higher value by paying a higher price. Even where 
the dedication by plat or map is not formally accepted by the appropriate authorities, persons who rely on 
the plat in making a purchase acquire an interest akin to an easement appurtenant in the rights of way.") 
(footnotes omitted). 
[ * P 1 9 ] For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that H / V 9?when a party acquires land via a deed 
that references a recorded plat showing privately owned streets or other privately owned areas of common 
use for the apparent benefit of the landowner, a right to use those streets or common areas will typically 
arise in favor of the landowner. This right may be enforced not only as against the original developer, but 
also as against neighboring [ * * * 1 7 ] landowners who attempt to interfere with the right. In keeping with 
Tuttle, however, when the street or common area is privately owned and the dispute is not with the original 
developer, equitable considerations come into play. These considerations include the intent of the parties, 
notice, and the purpose or use of the roadway or other common area at the t ime the land was acquired. For 
example, if the neighboring owners determined that the street or common area would be used for a 
different purpose prior to the new landowner's purchase of his or her lot, and the new purchaser of the lot 
had actual or constructive notice of the different purpose for the street or common area—and thus that any 
inconsistent plat designation was no longer viable—the right of use suggested by the plat may well be 
unenforceable. Cf. Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2004 UT App 256, P 24, 97 P.3d 697 (recognizing 
Utah's "longstanding doctrine that a private easement over platted streets arises upon the purchase of 
property with reference to the plat map, so long as the roads have not been legally vacated prior to the 
purchase"), aff'd, 2005 UT 74, 123 P.3d 432. 
[ * P 2 0 ] In accordance with our ruling, the trial [ * * * 1 8 ] court's conclusion that the Griffins had an 
easement to use the road based on the deed's reference to the p la t 5 is sustainable as a matter of law given 
that Oak Lane was used as a roadway at the time the Griffins obtained title to lot 2 and is still used as a 
roadway. Therefore, at the time the Griffins purchased their property and received a deed referencing the 
plat, it was entirely reasonable for the Griffins to assume that Oak Lane was what it purported to be based 
on the [ * * 7 1 ] referenced plat, i.e., a street they could use to access their property. 
FOOTNOTES 
5 Regardless of whether an actual easement arose, the right the Griffins obtained by reason of their 
deed referencing the plat clearly encompassed the right to use Oak Lane to access their property given 
that Oak Lane was being used in that way when they acquired their property in 1988—some fifteen 
years before the Association was even created. See generally Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, 
Inc., 2004 UT 23, P 2 1 , 89 P.3d 155 ( , u [A]n appellate court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any 
proper grounds, even though the trial court relied on some other ground.'") (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted). 
I. There Are No Material [ * * * 1 9 ] Disputed Facts 
[ * P 2 1 ] The Association further argues that the trial court's summary judgment ruling is not sustainable 
>ecause there are three material disputed facts "relating to the use, ownership^] and the nature of Oak 
.ane." We disagree. While there are definitely facts in dispute, none of those facts are material to a 
letermination of whether the Griffins had a right to use Oak Lane to access their property. See generally 
Jtah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
[ * P 2 2 ] First, whether the Griffins continuously used the road does not determine whether or not an 
asement or right arose, as would be true with a prescriptive easement. 6 Cf. Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 
0 1 , 126 P. 959, 965 (1912) (indicating that a landowner can abandon an easement but that abandonment 
f a private easement will not be "lost by mere nonuse[]"); supra note 4 (discussing case law indicating 
nat the right of use arises based on equities and the inferred intent of the parties existing when the 
rantor grants the property to the grantee). The Griffins' right arose based on their deed's reference to the 
^corded plat and the lane's use as a roadway at the time of their acquisition. 
FOOTNOTES 
5 HN10!h/\ prescriptive easement requires continuous use. See Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, P 17, 
377 P.2d 533 [ * * * 2 0 ] ("In order to establish a prescriptive easement in Utah, [one] must show a use 
:hat is (1) open, (2) notorious, (3) adverse, and (4) continuous for at least twenty years."). Continuous 
jse is also a requirement when claiming a right based on the typical easement by implication. See id. P 
L6 ("There are four elements necessary to constitute an easement by implication: (1) unity of title 
bllowed by severance; (2) at the time of severance the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible; 
'3) the easement is reasonably necessary to enjoy the dominant estate; and (4) use of the easement 
vas continuous rather than sporadic"). However, under Tuttle and our ruling in this case, continuous 
jse is not necessary when claiming a right of use based on a recorded plat. 
* P 2 3 ] Second, ownership of the road is not material because the easement came into being irrespective 
of who or what entity owned Oak Lane given the Griffins' deed's reference to the plat and the obvious 
purpose of Oak Lane as a road by which to access the subdivision lots. 7 And third, the precise nature of the 
road is also not material to the resolution of this appeal. 8 The trial court's ruling is based on the legal 
determination that [ * * * 2 1 ] an easement arose to use Oak Lane when the Griffins received title to lot 2 
and the deed referenced the subdivision plat. Since a right would arise under the facts of [ * * 7 2 ] this 
case regardless of whether Oak lane was public, private, or some variation of the two, 9 this fact is also not 
material to the legal determination. 10 
FOOTNOTES 
7 There clearly is a dispute regarding ownership of Oak Lane. One interpretation of the facts, however, 
is that the Griffins actually have a part ownership interest in Oak Lane and that therefore the 
Association would not have received clear title to Oak Lane when the Griffins did not transfer their 
interest in Oak Lane to the Association. 
Contrary to the Association's arguments, the plat indicates that the original lot 2 owners were part 
owners of the road, as were the other four lot owners. While one of the original owners of lot 2 signed 
the quitclaim deed purportedly transferring ownership of the road to the Association, it is doubtful that 
he would have retained any ownership interest in the road after lot 2 was transferred to the second 
owners. Such ownership interest likely would have been passed from owner to owner with the transfer 
of lot 2. Further, while the [ * * * 2 2 ] first owners clearly had an easement or right to use Oak Lane by 
virtue of the recorded plat, it is doubtful they would have been able to permanently sever such an 
easement or right from lot 2. See generally Wood v. Ashby, 122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d 351 , 354 (1952) 
( H / ¥ I i 7" [AJ right of way appurtenant to an estate is appurtenant to every part of it and inures to the 
benefit of the owners of every part."); Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264, 272 (1947) 
("[F]or it is a well-recognized rule of law that, on a severance of an estate by a sale of a part thereof, all 
easements of a permanent character, that have been created in favor of the land sold, and which are 
open and plain to be seen, and are reasonably necessary for its use and convenient enjoyment, unless 
expressly reserved by the grantees, pass as appurtenances to the land."); Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 
501 , 126 P. 959, 962 (1912) (indicating that a private easement arising in a public road based on a plat 
is appurtenant to the iand). 
8 The opposite was true in the earlier appeal. In Oak Lane Homeowners Ass'n v. Griffin, 2006 UT App 
465, 153 P.3d 740, we remanded because we concluded there was a dispute of material fact. See id. P 
10. [ * * * 2 3 ] The trial court's earlier decision had rested squarely on the conclusion that Oak Lane was 
a common-use private lane, and we determined that the question of whether Oak Lane was a common-
use private lane turned on material facts in dispute. See id. PP 5, 10. 
9 To the extent there is a dispute regarding whether the plat clearly shows that Oak Lane was a private 
lane, rather than a public lane, such a dispute is not material under our holding because the Griffins' 
right to use Oak Lane would have arisen regardless of whether Oak Lane was private or public. 
10 We are not unmindful of the real underlying problem, namely that the other lot owners do not want 
the Griffins to essentially use Oak Lane as a pad on which to park vehicles and that the Griffins, while 
pleased to use the lane, do not want to contribute to its maintenance. Whether such a use is within the 
scope of the right the Griffins have in Oak Lane or whether the Griffins can be required to help pay to 
maintain Oak Lane has not been briefed, and we accordingly do not resolve these issues. We note, 
however, that the trial court's ruling indicates that the Griffins' easement or right of use only includes 
"access, ingress and egress [ * * * 2 4 ] from Oak Lane to their property." Furthermore, we note that 
when more than one landowner has an interest in an abutting street, absent an agreement otherwise, 
the presumption is that they should divide maintenance costs pro rata. See Aspen Acres Ass'n v. Seven 
Assocs., 29 Utah 2d 303, 508 P.2d 1179, 1183 (1973) ("Absent any agreement on the question of 
maintenance of a private way, the burden of upkeep should be distributed between dominant and 
servient tenements in proportion to their relative use of the road, as nearly as such may be 
ascertained.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
[*P24] We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the Griffins summary judgment because 
Jtah case law fully supports its determination that a right to use Oak Lane to access lot 2 arose in favor of 
:he Griffins when their deed referenced the recorded plat showing that lot 2 abuts Oak Lane, given that Oak 
_ane was used as a road to access lots within the subdivision at the time the Griffins purchased lot 2. 
rurther, although some facts are clearly in dispute, none of the disputed facts identified by the Association 
are material, given the applicable legal analysis. We accordingly [ * * * 2 5 ] affirm the trial court's summary 
udgment ruling. 
Sregory K. Orme •, Judge 
[*P25] WE CONCUR: 
William A. Thorne lr •., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
ames Z. Davis
 y , Judge 
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ADDENDUM D 
ADDENDUM D 
§ 12.02(b) UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW § 12.02(b)(2) 
§ 12.02(b). Creation. 
§ 12.02(b)(1). Express Easements. 
An easement may be created by express words of either a formal grant or of a reservation or 
exception in a conveyance of land. A grant creates an easement in the grantee, while a reservation 
may result in creating an easement for the grantor in the land being conveyed. Easements may also be 
created as a covenant or through a conveyance referring either to a plat depicting easements or to a 
recorded declaration of easements.19 The same formalities apply to creation of easements as in any-
other conveyance. As an easement is a property interest, the creating instrument must satisfy the 
statute of frauds.20 The document should also be recorded in order to provide constructive notice to 
any subsequent purchaser.21 Otherwise someone might purchase the property free of the easement 
under the doctrine protecting a subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice." 
Questions of interpretation often arise regarding: (1) the extent of the easement and (2) whether it 
is appurtenant or in gross.2" To avoid future litigation the draftsman must use great care to identify 
clearly and specifically. (1) the parties, (2) the properties involved, (3) the kind of easement created 
(appurtenant or in gross), and (4) the limits, permitted uses, and duration of the easement.24 
A recital of consideration should be included if the grant of easement is not incorporated in the 
conveyance of the underlying fee.2' 
§ 12.02(b)(2). Implied Easements. 
Implied easements are three specific types — implied easements based on a prior use, easements by 
necessity and easements implied from a subdivision plat.26 While express easements are created by 
written expressions of intent, implied easements arise from the circumstances of a transaction or the 
circumstances surrounding the properties involved"'. Courts are willing to imply an easement because 
they are convinced that the parties intended to create an easement based on the circumstances 
accompanying a conveyance of property. The court thereby brings into existence the results of the 
perceived, unexpressed intent of the parties derived from the facts of the situation. 
19. Robert Kratovil, Easement Draftsmanship and Conveyancings 38 CAL. L. REV. 426. 437-38 (1950): see also View 
Condo. Owners Ass'n v. MS1CO, L.L.C., 90 P.3d 1042. 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (Recording a declaration or plat setting 
out servitudes does not, by itself, create servitudes. If all the property is owned by a single owner, then no servitude can 
arise. Only when the developer conveys a parcel subject to the declaration do the servitudes arise.). 
20. Warburton v. Virginia Beach Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 781-782 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
21. See Arnold Industries. Inc. v. Love, 63 P.3d 721 (Utah 2002) (discussing constructive notice of an easement in spite 
of abstraction errors); Evans v. Bd. of County Comnrrs, 123 P.3d 432 (Utah 2005) (not always necessary to fix location of 
easement in descriptive language of a deed). 
22. See 4 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.21 (Matthew Bender 1998); BACKMAN & THOMAS, 
supra note 6. at § 1.02[1]. 
23. Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 384 P.2d 590 (Utah 1963); Johnson v. Higley, 989 P.2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
24. A model form for the creation of an easement is included in Robert Kratovil, Real Estate Law 32-33 (Prentice-Hall 
8th ed. 1979); see also Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P.2d 355 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (easement cannot be created in favor of a third 
party' who is a stranger to the transaction); Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). 
25. See Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
26. A private easement can exist by reliance on a subdivision plat and can extend over abutting public ways. See Carrier 
v. Lindquist. 37 P.3d 1112 (Utah 2001). 
27. See Butler v. Lee. 774 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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§ i2.02(b)(2)(i) SERVITUDES AND OTHER RIGHTS § 12.02(b)(2)(i) 
Once they exist implied easements pass as appurtenances to the land.28 A right of way appurtenant 
to an estate is appurtenant to every part, but partition of the dominant tenement cannot create 
additional easements across the servient tenement.29 
An easement does not inure to the benefit of the owner of a parcel which after division does not 
abut the right of way/0 Where resulting use after further partition (successive to the severance which 
created die easement) will increase the burden upon the servient estate, the right to the easement will 
be extinguished/1 _. . , 
Implied easements do not violate the statute of frauds because the parties in fact did convey 
property through a written document/2 The easement is an inferred expansion of the conveyance 
language for the associated property. Strict rules apply to the creation of implied easements because 
they are not specifically mentioned in the recorded documents applying to the affected properties. 
Fairness to subsequently affected third parties demands that implied easements should arise only 
under convincing and compelling circumstances. 
§ 12.02(b)(2)(i). Implied Easement Based on Prior Use. 
The implied easement based on prior use of the property is recognized if four requirements are 
satisfied. First, both the dominant and servient estates must have belonged to the same person as a 
single parcel before a conveyance divided the required unity of title/3 The original owner may end up 
owning a portion of the severed parcel or both portions may be conveyed to two new owners. During 
the existence of the unity of title, the owner must use one part of the property to benefit another 
portion. Thus, a driveway may cross the front part of the single parcel to provide access to the back 
area of the property. While one person owns the whole area, no easement exists because property 
owners cannot have an easement over their own property. The beneficial use of the driveway, 
however, becomes an easement by implication when the landowner severs the back part of the lot 
from the front portion through a transfer to another person. 
Second, if a severing conveyance of a portion of the property results in an implied easement, the 
prior use must be apparent, obvious and visible at the time of the severance/4 When an inspection of 
the property would result in notice of the prior use, the court can assume that the parties were aware 
of its existence and that fairness permits recognition of an implied easement. 
Third, the easement across the burdened portion of the separated lands must be reasonably 
necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant parcel. Courts apply a flexible standard for measuring 
necessity. The degree of necessity required by courts will vary with the circumstances/" Generally, a 
use is reasonably necessary if it is practical to the claimant's use of his property or if significant 
expense would arise in providing for an alternative solution if the claimed easement were not 
28. Adamson v. Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264 (Utah 1947). 
29. Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. See B AC KM AN & THOMAS, supra note 6, at § 2.02[1]. 
33. Ovard v. Cannon, 600 P.2d 1246, 1247 (Utah 1979); Choumos v. Alkema, 494 P.2d 950, 952 (Utah 1972); Butler v. 
Lee, 774 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
34. Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
35. Butler, 774 P.2d at 1154. 
§ 12.02(b)(2)(ii) UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW § 12.02(b)(3) 
recognized. If the grantor is claiming to have reserved an implied easement, the courts generally 
apply a stricter measurement of proof than when it is alleged to arise in favor of the grantee;16 
Fourth, to have an implied easement based on a prior use, the benefited party must continue to use 
the easement."7 
§ 12.02(b)(2)(ii). Easement by Necessity. 
The easement by necessity is based on the public policy of maximizing the productive use of 
land."'8 This type of implied easement is recognized because it is necessary in order for the easement 
holder to have reasonable use of the dominant property. Thus, a landlocked property would be cut off 
from access to any public roads unless the courts recognize an implied easement across a neighbor's 
property. The required circumstances are similar for both the easement by necessity and the implied 
easement based on prior use.j9 The requirements are: (1) unity7 of title followed by severance. (2t 
apparent obvious and visible use, (3) necessity of the easement for enjoyment of the dominant estate. 
and (4) continuous use.40 The test for necessity is greater for the easement by necessity'' than in the 
case of an easement implied from prior use.41 Such an easement is based on the theory of a grant by 
reason of the circumstances at the time of severance, and is inconsistent with the adversity 
contemplated in the prescription theory.42 
Several limitations apply to recognition of an easement by necessity. A claimant cannot have the 
benefits of an easement by necessity if that person has created the conditions producing the 
necessity.43 An owner who blocks an existing access road by building a structure is not entitled to an 
easement by necessity over neighboring property. The claimant can remedy the lack of access by 
removing the obstructing building. The easement by necessity terminates if the need for the easement 
no longer exists. 
§ 12.02(b)(2)(iii). Implied Easement Based on a Subdivision Plat 
When an owner subdivides property in accordance with a map (or plat or plan), a purchaser who of 
a lot within the subdivision acquires an easement over private streets as laid out on the map even if 
the easement is not expressly created in the documents of conveyance. 
§ 12.02(b)(3). Prescriptive Easements. 
An easement may be created by prescription (adverse use) for an extended period. Adverse use 
differs from adverse possession in that an adverse user has merely used the property for a right of way 
or other easement purpose, rather than using it as owner. The purpose of these related doctrines is to 
protect parties against disruption of expectations they have had over a period of years without 
36. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 22, at § 34.08[4]. 
37. Chournos, 494 P.2d at 952 . 
38. See BACKMAN & THOMAS, supra note 6, at § 2.02[3][b]. 
39. Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 44 P.3d 642 (Utah 2001); Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources 
Corp., 555 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1976). 
40. Savage v. Nielsen, 197 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah 1948). 
41. Alcorn v. Reading, 243 P. 922, 926 (Utah 1926). 
42. Id. 
43. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 22, at § 34.07. 
44. Williams v. Shearwood, 688 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1984); see also POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 22, at § 34.1Q. 
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ADDENDUM E 
EASEMENTS AND LICENSES §21 
of the way, the grantee acquires a right to the way not merely in front of his 
or her property, but also to the full extent of the way as indicated.5 However, 
the grantee may acquire a right in a way described as a boundary only to the 
extent necessary to give him or her access to a public street or highway.6 
§21 On conveyance wi th reference to map or plat 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Easements <3=»17(3), (4) 
Conveyance of lot with reference to map or plat as giving purchaser rights in indicated streets, 
alleys, or areas not abutting his lot, 7 A.L.R. 2d 607 
Complaint, petition, or declaration—For declaratory judgment as to way of necessity—Convey-
ance from common grantor as a private dedication of and grant of right-of-way. Am. Jur . 
Pleading and Practice Forms, Easements and Licenses § 14 
Proof of Intent to Abandon Easement, 53 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 519 
Generally, where property sold is described in the conveyance with refer-
ence to a plat or map on which streets, alleys,1 parks, and other open areas2 
are shown, an easement therein is created in favor of the grantee. Such an 
easement is deemed a part of the property to which the grantee is entitled,3 
and exists entirely independent of dedication to a public use.4 
An easement created on conveyance with a reference to a map or plat is 
not negated by the fact that the map or plat is not properly made or recorded 
for purposes of dedication.5 Such an easement also is not negated by the 
mere failure of the public authorities to accept the streets or ways, or by an 
abandonment of them.6 
Such an easement does not arise unless the conveyance refers to the map 
or plat which indicates the way, park, or other area in which an easement is 
5Jones v. Sedwick, 383 Pa. 120, 117 A.2d 
709(1955). 
6Brooks-Garrison Hotel Corp. v. Sara Inv. 
Co., 61 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1952). 
[Section 21] 
1
 Judge v. Rago, 570 A.2d 253 (Del. 1990); 
Northpark Associates No. 2, Ltd. v. Homart 
Development Co., 262 Ga. 138, 414 S.E.2d 214 
•1992); Bache v. Owens, 267 Mont. 279, 883 
P-2d 817 (1994); Catalano v. Woodward, 617 
A.2d 1363 (R.I. 1992); McAllister v. Smiley, 
•301 S.C, 10, 389 S.E.2d 857 (1990); Ryder v. 
Petrea, 243 Va. 421, 416 S.E.2d 686 (1992): 
Russakoffv. Scruggs, 241 Va. 135, 400 S.E.2d 
529 0991). 
A developer's conveyance of parcels in a 
private community to two individuals , as 
-rustees of the developer, with a deed referenc-
e s a tiled map that i l lustrated roads in the 
immunity, did not convey an ownership inter-
'
:
-* m roads, giving rise to an easement by 
implication. II Giardino, LLC v. Belle Haven 
Land Co., 254 Conn. 502, 757 A.2d 1103 (2000). 
2Northpark Associates No. 2, Ltd. v. Hom-
art Development Co., 262 Ga. 138, 414 S.E.2d 
214 (1992); Bache v. Owens, 267 Mont. 279, 
883 P.2d 817 (1994); McAllister v. Smiley, 301 
S.C. 10, 389 S.E.2d 857 (1990). 
3Catalano v. Woodward, 617 A.2d 1363 
(R.I. 1992); Epps v. Freeman, 261 S.C. 375, 
200 S.E.2d 235 (1973). 
4Northpark Associates No. 2, Ltd. v. Hom-
art Development Co., 262 Ga. 138, 414 S.E.2d 
214 (1992); Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 
484 A.2d630 (1984). 
5Hackert v. Edwards, 22 Conn. Supp. 499, 
175 A.2d 381 (Super. Ct. 1961); Catalano v. 
Woodward, 617 A.2d 1363 (R.I. 1992). 
6Northpark Associates No. 2, Ltd. v. Horn-
art Development Co., 262 Ga. 138, 414 S.E.2d 
214 t l992); Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 
484 A.2d 630 (1984); Estojak v. Mazsa, 522 
Pa. 353, 562A.2d271 (1989). 
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claimed.7 An easement will be implied from a map or plat only if it was 
intended by the parties,8 and no easement can be implied where the grantor 
has no interest in the roads reflected on the plot map.9 
Under the "broad" view adopted by some jurisdictions, the grantee acquires 
a private right, frequently designated as an easement, to the use of all the 
streets and alleys delineated on the map or plat.10 Other jurisdictions sup-
port the "intermediate" view, referred to as the "beneficial" or the "complete 
enjoyment" rule, that the extent of the grantee's private right of user in 
streets or alleys shown on the map or plat is limited to such as are reason-
ably or materially beneficial to the grantee and of which the deprivation 
would reduce the value of his or her lot.11 Still other jurisdictions adhere to 
the "narrow" view, sometimes referred to as the "necessary" rule, that the 
private right of user accruing to the grantee in the streets and alleys referred 
to in the map or plat is limited to the abutting street and such others as are 
necessary to give hirn access to a public highway.12 
b. On Severance of Property 
(1) Easements Implied from Preexisting Uses 
(a) In General 
§22 Generally 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Easements @=»15.1 
Answer—Defense—To claim of implied easement by reservation. Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice 
Forms, Easements and Licenses § 92. 
Complaint, petition, or declaration—Obstruction of artificial drainage—Ditch draining residen-
tial subdivision—Implied, drainage easement. Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Waters 
§255 
Proof of Intent to Abandon Easement, 53 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 519 
Where an apparently permanent and obvious servitude is imposed on one 
part of an estate in favor of another part of the same estate or property, 
which servitude is in use at the time of severance and is necessary for the 
7Brooks-Garrison Hotel Corp. v. Sara Inv. 
Co., 61 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1952); Smith v. Gwin-
nett County, 248 Ga. 882, 286 S.E.2d 739 
(1982). 
Where the recorded plot showed ways and 
streets for property abutting the claimant's 
property, but the plot did not delineate the 
claimant's property, no easement was 
established. Judge v. Rago, 570 A.2d 253 (Del. 
1990). 
8Mikels v. Rager, 232 Cal. App. 3d 334, 
284 Cal. Rptr. 87 (4th Dist. 1991), reh'g 
denied and opinion modified, (Aug. 13, 1991); 
Jackson v. Knott, 418 Mass. 704, 640 N.E.2d 
109 (1994). 
*Mikels v. Rager, 232 Cal. App. 3d 334, 
284 Cal. Rptr. 87 (4th Dist. 1991), reh'g 
denied and opinion modified, (Aug. 13, 1991); 
Stankiewicz v. Miami Beach Ass'n, Inc., 191 
Conn. 165, 464 A.2d 26 (1983). 
10Stanley Heights Property Owners Ass'n, 
Inc. v. Whiteside, 151 Colo. 429, 378 P.2d 399 
(1963); Yurmanovich v; Johnston, 19 Wis. 2d 
494, 120 N.W.2d 707 (1963). 
11Enos v. Casey Mountain, Inc., 532 So. 2d 
703 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1988); Jaco-
way v. Palmer, 753 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1987); Bauer Enterprises, Inc. v. City of 
Elkins, 173 W. Va. 438, 317 S.E.2d 798 (1984). 
12Jackson v. Knott, 418 Mass. 704, 640 
N.E.2d 109 (1994); De Ruscio v. Jackson, 164 
A.D.2d 684, 565 N.Y.S.2d 593 (3d Dep't 1991). 
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§ 6().f)3(a)(3)(iii) THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.03(a)(3Hiif 
dedication would then return to those from whom it had been dedicated, rathei 
than to the abutting landowners.137 It would not be unreasonable, though, foi 
courts to assume that the fee ownership would have passed with the adjoining 
land absent an explicit statement to the contrary, in the same way as h done 
with railroad right of way easements.138 In one case, for example, where an 1872 
statute created public highways from all section lines in specified counties, those 
highways granted only an easement to the public; the fee title continued to be 
vested in the abutting landowners, in that case the original owners.139 Attempted 
statutory dedications that fail some requirement sometimes will still fulfill the 
requirements to be considered a common law dedication.140 One description oi 
the requirements for such a dedication is "(1) the parly platting the land intended 
to create an easement, and (2) the public accepted the easement."141 In Texas, 
mere failure to object to use by the public will not establish a common law or 
implied dedication: there must be some clear and unequivocal declaration by an 
owner of an intention to set the road apart for public use.142 An easement b> 
implied or common-law dedication and a public easement by prescription are 
sometimes difficult to distinguish, and the cases do not always do so successful-
ly.143 
§ 60.03(a)(3)(iii) Common Law Dedication by Reference to 
Map or Plat. 
One may dedicate land to the public by express language, by reservation, or 
by conduct showing an intern to dedicate. Such conduct intending a dedication 
may exist "where a plat is made showing streets and the land is sold either by 
express reference to such a plat or by a showing that the plat was used and referred 
137Terwelp v. Sass. 443 N.E.2J 804. 800 (III. App. 1982). 
1 3 8
 See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 622 A.2d 642. 647-648 (Del. 1993). 
139 Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Corp. ComnVn. 664 P.2d 798. 800 (Kan. 1983) (abutting 
landowners were those from whom the easement was taken). 
140Reiman v. Kale. 403 N.E.2d 1275. 1277-1278 (III. App. 1980). 
1 4 1
 See also Lncvano v. Maesias. 874 P.2d 788. 794 (N.M. App. 1994) (including as essential 
elements acts inducing belief owner intended dedication, that landowner was competent, that public 
relied on acts and will benefit from dedication and that there was offer and acceptance ol 
dedication): Koehler v. Price, 562 N.E.2d 370. 373 (111. App. 1990) (finding no dedication, but 
finding access easement by implication from prior use), citing Reiman v. Kale. 403 N.E.2d 1275 
1277 (III. App. 1980). 
14Z Roberts v. Allison, 836 S.W.2d 185. 189-190 (Tex. App. 1992). See also Chttds v. Sammons, 
534 S.E.2d 409. 410 (Ga. 2000) (mere use even for extended time by small portion of public doc5 
not support inference of dedication without express intention to dedicate and acceptance by public 
authorities). 
1 4 3
 Luevano v. Maestas. 874 P.2d 788. 794-795 (N.M App. 1994) (cases do not provide with 
clarity a basis for distinguishing prescription from implied dedication). 
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$).03(a)(4) THE LAW OF EASEMENTS § 60.03(a)(4) 
lin negotiations for the sale."144 "A developer's sale of lots in a subdivision 
icording to a recorded plat creates private easement rights in favor of purchasers 
i atty area set apart for their use."145 Those rights include areas like streets 
nd parks, and exist whether or not there has ever been acceptance by public 
jthorities or the public generally, on the ground that the purchasers have given 
uhsideration for the property's higher value by paying a higher price.146 Even 
-here the dedication by plat or map is not formally accepted by the appropriate 
jthorities, persons who rely on the plat in making a purchase acquire an interest 
kin to an easement appurtenant in the rights of way.147 Though the public may 
e foreclosed after the passage of sufficient time without acceptance by the 
overnmental unit or general public use, those who have purchased in reliance 
n the roads shown in a plat or plan retain a private easement that cannot be 
bridged by the governmental body absent compensation.148 This right applies 
> all members of the subdivision who purchased in reliance on the plat or plan, 
ot merely those with property abutting the easement.149 Use by the public can 
self constitute acceptance even in the absence of formal acceptance by public 
uthorities.150 Where a deed of dedication could not be found, reference to the 
edicated street in a recorded plat served to establish the easement.151 Simple 
lention of the existence of a road in a deed without, the requisite offer to and 
cceptance by the public authorities, however, may not suffice to create a 
edication.152 
COMPUTER-ASSISTED RESEARCH 
LEXIS: Easement /25 Dedicat! /25 Slatut! /25 Common law or Common Law 
/25 Distinguish or Distinct! or Difference 
60.03(a)(4) Who May Create Express Easements. 
.: Because an easement is an interest in land, anyone who is the possessor of 
be land may burden it with an easement: that easement cannot last any longer 
1 4 4
 Price v. Walker. 383 S.E.2d 086. 688 (N.C. App. 1989): Volco. Inc. v. Lickley. 889 P.2d 
099, 1102-1103 (Idaho 1995) (marked streets on recorded plat demonstrating dedication of 
uadway easements). 
**5 Northpark Assocs. No. 2. Ltd. v. Homart Dev. Co.. 414 S.E.2d 214. 215 (Ga. 1992). 
1 4 6
 Id. at 215-216. 
1 4? Price v. Walker, 383 S.E.2d 686. 688 (N.C. App. 1989). 
1 4 8
 See also Carrier v. Lindquist, 37 P.3d 1112. 1116 (Utah 2001) (quoting this sentence) (dis-
mte concerning private easement over former public alley: easement survives vacation of alley). 
»olis v. Coon. 496 A.2d 1188. 1192 (Pa. Super. 1985). 
14
*> Id. at 1193. 
iBOCatalano v. Woodward. 617 A.2d 1363. 1368 (R.I. 1992). 
iSlTown of Sparta v. Hamm, 387 S.E.2d 173. 175-176 (N.C. App), rev. denied 389 S.E.2d 
119 (N.C. 1990). 
152 Hereford v. Gingo-Morgan Park, 551 So. 2d 918. 920 (Ala. 1989). 
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§34.06 EASEMENTS AND LICENSES 34-40 
§ 34.06 Easements Can Be Created by Reference to Boundaries or Maps 
Where a conveyance of land describes the parcel as bounded by a street designated 
in the conveyance, or refers to a map on which spaces for streets, parks, or other 
common uses are shown, but the conveyance says nothing about the creation of an 
easement1 or a dedication to a public use,2 the conveyee of the land acquires an 
Wisconsin: Walterman v. Village of Norwalk, 145 Wis. 663, 130 N.W. 479 (1911). 
1
 See, e.g., United States v. Sandlass, 34 F. Supp 81 (D.NJ. 1940) (deed referred to map that showed 
roadway). 
See also: 
Delaware: Tindall v. Corbi, 37 Del. Ch 491,145 A.2d 247 (1958) (deod describing lot as bounded by 
private road). 
Florida: Tallahassee In v. Corp. v. Andrews, 185 So. 2d 705 (Ha. Dist. Ct App. 1966) (where titles of 
both plaintiff and defendants were from common source, neither title contained any reference to or 
reservation of streets and beach in plat of subdivision, and only mention of plat was for identification of 
starting points or boundaries, defendant's land was not burdened with easement for streets and beach). 
Idaho: Villager Condominium Ass'n v. Idaho Power Co., 121 Idaho 986, 121 Idaho 986, 829 R2d 
1335 (1992); Smylie v. Pearsall. 93 Idaho 188, 457 P.2d 427 (1969). 
Maryland: Adams v. Peninsula Prod ExcL, 138 Md. 656, 115 A. 106 (1921). 
New York Huggins v. Castle Estates, Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 427, 369 N.Y.S.2d 80, 330 N.E.2d 48 (1975) 
(reference to zoning restriction on plat map did not create negative easement). - — 
Pennsylvania: Reed v. Reese, 473 Pa. 321, 374 A.2d 665 (1976) (where unrecorded plan showed park 
adjacent to plaintiff's lot and plaintiff's deed referred to plan, easement for plaintiff established). 
Rhode Island: Robidoux v. Pelletier, 120 R.I. 425, 391 A.2d 1150 (R.I. 1978) (recorded plat was all 
that was needed to disclose landowner's dedicatory intent). 
Tennessee: Baker v. Butler. 51 Teiux App. 111. 364 S.W.2d 916 (1962), cert, denied, 211 Tenn. 314, 
364 S.W.2d 922 (1963). 
Washington: Clippinger v. Birge, 14 Wash. App 976. 547 P.2d 871 (1976) (no easement found on 
plat). 
Wisconsin Yurmanovich \. Johnston, 19 Wis. 2d 494, 120 N.W.2d 707 (1963). 
But see Rudder v. Mamanasco Lake Park Ass'n. 93 Conn. App. 759. 890 A.2d 645 (2006) (citing this 
Treatise; ("Here, the individual defendants' deeds included express easement provisions giving them the 
right to use the roads of the subdivision Accordingly, the plaintiffs' argument, concerning easements 
that are implied from maps referenced in deeds, clearly does not pertain to the facts of this matter, and 
the court correctly concluded that it was inapplicable.")-
2
 The filing of a tract map constitutes a public dedication of the streets shown thereon in some states, 
as for example, in Kentucky. See Rudd v. Kittinger, 309 Ky. 315, 217 S.W.2d 651 (1949). It constitutes 
only an offer of public dedication in other states, which is revocable prior to acceptance by the appropriate 
municipal authority. See People v. Reed, 81 Cal. 70. 22 P. 474 (1889); Rose v. Fisher. 130 W. Va. S3, 
130 W. Va. 53, 42 S.E.2d 249 (1947). In the former of these types of jurisdictions, the existence of a 
private easement of way is seldom important under such deeds as are discussed in this section, but in the 
second type of jurisdiction such private easements can have importance when an offered dedication is 
rejected or revoked, as for example, in Burkhard v. Bowen. 32 Wash. 2d 613. 203 P.2d 361 (1949). 
commented on in 26 Wash. L. Rev. 142 (1951). 
Florida: Mumaw v. Roberson, 60 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1952) (finding no acceptance of offer of public 
dedication and that private easement created by conveyance referring to plat on which street and beach 
were shown barred by adverse possession); City of Miami v. Eastern Realty Co.. 202 So. 2d 760 (1967) 
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easement with respect to the street3 or the areas shown on the map.4 In one sense such 
(where subdivides dedicated park strip to purchasers of lots and expressly provided that there was no 
dedication to public, but thereafter over extensive period of time city maintained park without objection 
by subdivides, their successors, or lot owners, offer of dedication and acceptance of park strip by city for 
public could be inferred). 
Illinois: Cook v. Mighell Constr. Co., 40 DL App. 3d 1032,353 N.E.2d 43 (HI. App. Ct. 1976) (where 
landowners' rights were derived from platting of subdivision and street was vacated by municipality, 
landowners abutting vacated street, and those seeking access thereto, had easement of access of their 
property that was not extinguished by municipality's vacating street). 
Michigan: Rindone v. Corey Community Church, 335 Mich. 311, 55 N.W.2d 844 (1952) (deed 
referring to recorded plat entitled grantee to use of streets and ways laid down on plat regardless of 
whether there was sufficient dedication and acceptance to constitute public dedication). 
New Hampshire: 700 Lake Ave. Realty Co. v. Doileman, 121 N.R 619, 433 A.2d 1261 (1981). 
Mew York: Stupnicki v. Southern N.Y. Fish & Game Comm'n, 41 Misc. 2d 266, 244 N.Y.S.2d 558 
(1962); O'Hara v. Wallace, 83 Misc. 2d 383, 371 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1915) Judgment modified O'Hara v. 
Wallace, 52 A.D.2d 622, 382 N.Y.S.2d 350 (2d Dept. 1976). 
Rhode Island: Gammons v. Caswell, 447 A.2d 361 (R.I. 1982). 
3
 Mills v. Smith, 203 Ga. 444, 47 S.E.2d 260 (1948). 
See also: 
Maryland: Layman v. Gnegy, 26 Md. App. 114, 337 A.2d 126 (1975). 
Massachusetts: Casella v. Sneirson, 325 Mass. 85, 89, 89 N.E.2d 8 N.E.2d (1949); Patterson v. 
Simonds, 324 Mass. 344, 86 N.E.2d 630 (1949). 
Montana: McPherson v. Monegan, 120 Mont 454, 187 P.2d 542 (1947). 
Nevada: City Motel Inc. v. State, 75 Nev. 137, 336 R2d 375 (1959). 
Pennsylvania: Pods v. Coon, 344 Pa. Super. 443, 496 A.2d 1188 (1985). 
South Carolina: McAllister v. Smiley, 301 S.C. 10, 389 S.E.2d 857 (S.C. 1989) (court held that 
northern adjoining landowners had implied easement at law over road on northern boundary of their 
southern adjoining landowner's property). 
Virginia: Walters v. Smith, 186 Va. 159, 41 S.E.2d 617 (1947) (finding implied easement m street 
created by reference to map). 
See: 
Federal: Smith v. deFreitas, 329 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1964). 
Connecticut: Gerald Park Improvement Ass'n, Inc. v. Bini, 138 Conn. 232, 83 A.2d 195 (1951). 
Maine: Arnold v. Boulay 147 Me. 116, 83 A.2d 574 (1951). 
Maryland: Klein v. Dove, 205 Md 285, 107 A.2d 82 (1954). 
Massachusetts: Olson v. Arruda, 328 Mass. 363, 104 N.E.2d 145 (1952). 
Missouri: Larkin v. Kieseimann, 259 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1953). 
New York: Hecht v. Launer, 30 Misc. 2d 47, 222 N.YS.2d 569 (1961), afa\ 14 A.D.2d 964, 222 
N.Y.S.2d 687 (1961); Feuer v. Brenning, 279 AD. 1033, 112 N.Y.S.2d 382, afd, 304 N.Y. 881, 110 
N.E.2d 173 (1953); Fiebelkom v. Rogacki, 280 A.D. 20, 111 N.YS.2d 898, afa\ 305 N.Y. 725, 112 
N.E.2d 846 (1953); Fortwal Realties, Inc. v. Fitzsimons, 117 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1952). 
Ohio: Krzewinski v. Eaton Homes, Inc., 108 Ohio App. 175, 161 N.E.2d 88 (1958). 
Pennsylvania: Jones v. Sedwick, 383 Pa. 120, 117 A.2d 709 (1955). 
Rhode Island: Vailone v. City of Cranston, 97 R.I. 248, 197 A.2d 310 (1964). 
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